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Understanding Theory of Mind: Beliefs, Intents, and Mental States, Slides of Philosophy of mind

The concept of Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, enabling interpersonal understanding and predicting behavior. the Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks, Japanese epistemic modality, and a corpus study. ToM is crucial for social interaction and language use.

Typology: Slides

2021/2022

Uploaded on 03/31/2022

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481 - Theory of Mind 1
Theory of Mind (ToM)
Read: Wikipedia article on Theory
of Mind
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Download Understanding Theory of Mind: Beliefs, Intents, and Mental States and more Slides Philosophy of mind in PDF only on Docsity!

Theory of Mind (ToM)

Read: Wikipedia article on Theory

of Mind

ToM: interpersonal

understanding of mental states

  • Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states--beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.--to oneself and others.
  • It enables one to understand that mental states can be the cause of--and thus be used to explain and predict--others’ behavior.
  • One must be able to conceive of the mind as a “generator of representations” and to understand that others’ mental representations of the world do not necessarily reflect reality and can be different from one’s own.
  • It is a ‘theory’ of mind in that such representations are not “directly observable”.
  • Many other human abilities--from skillful social interaction to language use--are said to involve a theory of mind.

Smarties (appearance-reality)

task

  • Experimenters ask children what they believe to be the contents of a box that looks as though it holds a candy called “Smarties.”
  • After the child guesses (usually) “Smarties”, each is shown that the box in fact contained pencils.
  • The experimenter then re-closes the box and asks the child what she thinks another person, who has not been shown the true contents of the box, will think is inside.
  • The child fails the task if she responds that another person will think that the box contains pencils.
  • Gopnik & Astington (1988) found that children pass this test at age four or five years.

Matsui et al. 2006

  • Matsui, Tomoko, Taeko Yamamoto, Peter McCagg. 2006. “On the role of language in children’s early understanding of others as epistemic beings.” Cognitive Development 21.158-173.

• Japanese epistemic modality:

  • Certainty:
    • Particles: yo vs. kana
    • Verbs: shitteru (‘know’) vs. omou (‘think’)
  • Evidentiality
    • Particles: yo vs. tte
    • Verbs: miru (‘see’) vs. kiku (‘hear that’)
  • Corpus study: Tai, 1;5-3;

Procedure

  • Child watches an animation of of a thief ambiguously

hiding four different objects in four separate

containers.

  • “Let’s ask the rabbit and the frog where the car is.”
  • Rabbit: “the one the car is in is in the red box dayo .”
  • Frog: “the one the car is in is in the blue box kana .”
  • “Which container is the car in”
  • Child is “correct” if he or she picks the red box (adults

do this).

  • Modality study:
    • Evidentiality contrasts were significantly more

difficult than certainty contrasts.

  • Verb contrasts were significantly more difficult

than particle contrasts.

  • Children also did Sally-Anne and Smarties tasks. - The comprehension of epistemic modality

conveyed by verbs ( know-think , see-hear )

significantly relates to whether or not children pass

the false-belief tasks.

  • Comprehension of modality as conveyed through

particles has no significant relation with false-belief

understanding.

Discussion

  • Early understanding of the particles provides important information about children’s understanding of other’s epistemic mental states in general.
  • Passing false-belief tasks involves explicit representational theory of mind.
  • It has been reported that children who fail false-belief tasks do show procedural, unconscious grasp of another’s mind.
  • Japanese 3-year old’s understanding of other’s knowledge states may similarly be of an implicit kind, though the concept of implicit understanding itself requires further clarification.
  • A consistent, working understanding of knowledge states precedes fully representational understandings of (false) beliefs.
  • The early working understanding of others as epistemic beings is deeply situated in frequent, continuous, and largely verbal

interaction.